Abstract. In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps and partial information. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic differential game problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an equivalent maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtain as a corollary. We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under penalty entropy. We also apply the result to find optimal investment of an insurance firm under model uncertainty.
Introduction
The expected utility theory can be seen as the theory of decision making under uncertainty based on some postulates of preference. In the classical case, the preference is driven by a time-additive functional and a constant rate discount future reward. In the standard expected utility maximization problem, the investor is assumed to know the initial probability measure that governs the dynamic of the underlying. This means that she knows the original distribution of the uncertainty. However, it is difficult or even impossible to find an individual worthwhile probability distribution of the uncertainty. Moreover, in finance and insurance, there is no conformism on which original probability should be used to model uncertainty. This led to the study of utility maximization under model uncertainty, the uncertainty here, being represented by a family of absolute continuous (or equivalent) probability distribution. The idea is to solve the problem for each distribution belonging to the above mentioned class and choose the one that gives the worst objective value. More specifically, the investor maximizes the expected utility with respect to each measure in this class, and chooses among all, the portfolio with the lowest value. This is also called a robust optimization problem and has been intensively studied the past years. For more information, the reader may consult [1, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15] and references therein.
Stochastic control problem for Markovian regime-switching model has received a lot of attention recently; See for e.g., [2, 3, 12, 13, 17, 19] . Each state of the Markov chain represents a state of an economy. Hence, one can include structural changes in economic conditions of the state process. In this paper, we study an optimal control problem of recursive utility for Markov regime-switching jump-diffusion process under model uncertainty. Let mention that the notion of recursive utility was introduced in discrete time in [8, 18] , to untie the concepts of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution aversion which are not treated independently in the standard utility formulation. This concept was extended to continuous time in [4] and called stochastic differential utility (SDU). The performance functional in our stochastic differential utility case can be represented as the solution of controlled Markov-switching backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). As pointed above, the agent seeks the strategy which maximizes the value functional in the worst possible choice of probability distribution. In fact, it is assumed that the mean relative growth rate of the risky asset is not known to the agent, but subject to uncertainty, hence it can be regarded as a stochastic control which plays against the agent. This problem can be seeing as a Markov switching (zero-sum) stochastic differential game between the agent and the market. Such a problem was studied in [7] , where the authors introduced a model to discuss an optimal investment problem of an insurance company using a game theoretic approach. The objective of the insurance company being to choose an optimal investment strategy so as to maximize the expected exponential utility of terminal wealth in the worst-case scenario. Their model is general enough to include financial risk, economic risk, insurance risk, and model risk. The stock prices dynamics, the interest rate and the aggregate insurance claim process are modulated by a Markov chain. The authors used the dynamic programming approach to solve the problem and derive explicit solutions. In this paper, we instead use an approach based on stochastic maximum principle, and generalize their results to the framework of (nonzero-sum) forward-backward stochastic differential games and also more general dynamics for the state process. We also obtain explicit formulas for the optimal strategies of the market and the insurance company, when the utility is of exponential type and the Markov chain has two states. It is worth mentioning that, unlike in [7] , in our derivation of the closed forms solutions, we do not assume that the interest rate is zero.
Our paper is also motivated by the idea developed in [14, 13, 15] , where the authors derive a general maximum principle for forward-backward stochastic differential games, stochastic differential games with delay and Markov regime-switching stochastic control with partial information, respectively. One important advantage of our approach is that we may relax the assumption of concavity on our Hamiltonian. We derive a general maximum principle for forward-backward Markov regime-switching stochastic differential under model uncertainty. Using this result, we study a problem of recursive utility maximization with entropy penalty. We show that the optimal solution is the solution to a quadratic Markov switching backward stochastic differential equation. This result extend the results in [1, 11] by considering a Markov regime-switching state process, and more general stochastic differential utility.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate our control problem. In Section 3, we derive a partial information stochastic maximum principle for forward backward stochastic differential game for a Markov switching Lévy process under model uncertainty. In Section 4, we apply our results to study first a robust utility maximization with entropy penalty and second a problem of optimal investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. In the latter case, explicit expressions for optimal strategies are derived.
Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the general problem of stochastic differential games of Markov regime-switching forward-backward SDEs. Let (Ω, F, P ) be a filtered probability space, where P is a reference probability measure.
Suppose that the state process X(t) = X (u) (t, ω); 0 ≤ t ≤ T, ω ∈ Ω, is a controlled Markov regime-switching jump-diffusion of the form
where {B(t)} 0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion and N (dt, dz) := N (dζ, ds) − ν α (dζ) ds is an independent compensated Markov regime-switching Poisson random measure with ν α (dζ) ds, the compensator (or dual predictable projection) of N , defined by:
For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, ν j (dζ) is the conditional density of the jump size when the Markov chain α is in state e j and satisfies R 0 min(1, ζ 2 )ν j (dζ) < ∞. α := {α(t)} 0≤t≤T is an irreducible homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain with a finite state space S = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e D } ⊂ R D , where D ∈ N, and the jth component of e n is the Kronecker delta δ nj for each n, j = 1, . . . , D. Denote by Λ := {λ nj : 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D} the rate (or intensity) matrix of the Markov chain under P . Hence, for each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, λ nj is the transition intensity of the chain from state e n to state e j at time t. Recall that for n = j, λ nj ≥ 0 and D j=1 λ nj = 0, hence λ nn ≤ 0. It was shown in [6] that α admits the following semimartingale representation
where M := {M (t)} t∈[0,T ] is a R D -valued (F, P )-martingale and Λ T denotes the transpose of a matrix. For each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, with n = j, and t ∈ [0, T ], denote by J nj (t) the number of jumps from state e n to state e j up to time t. It can be shown (see [6] ) that
where m nj := {m nj (t)} t∈[0,T ] with m nj := t 0 α(s−), e n dM (s), e j is a (F, P )-martingale. Fix j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, denote by Φ j (t) the number of jumps into state e j up to time t. Then
with Φ j (t) = D n=1,n =j m nj (t) and λ j (t) = D n=1,n =j λ nj t 0 α(s−), e n ds. Note that, for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D},
We suppose that F = {F t } 0≤t≤T is the P -augmentation of the natural filtration associated with B, N and α. In our model, u = (u 1 , u 2 ), with u i being the control of player i; i = 1, 2. We suppose that the different level of information available at time t to the player i; i = 1, 2 are modeled by two subfiltrations
Denote by A i the set of admissible control of player i, contained in the set of E (i) t -predictable processes; i = 1, 2.
The functions b, σ, γ and η are given such that for all t, b(t, x, e n , u, ·), σ(t, x, e n , u, ·), γ(t, x, e n , u, ζ, ·) and η(t, x, e n , u, ·), n = 1, . . . , D are F t -measurable for all x ∈ R, u ∈ A 1 × A 2 and ζ ∈ R 0 and (2.1) has a unique strong solution.
We consider the associated BSDE's in the unknowns
(2.7)
, 2 be given C 1 functions with respect to their arguments and ψ ′ i (x) ≥ 0, for all x, i = 1, 2. Assume that the performance functional for each player i, i = 1, 2 is as follows
Here, f i , ϕ i and ψ i may be seen as profit rates, bequest functions and "utility evaluations" respectively, of the player i; i = 1, 2. For t = 0, we put
We shall consider the non-zero sum stochastic differential game problem, that is, we analyze the following:
If it exists, we call such a pair (u * 1 , u * 2 ) a Nash Equilibrium. This intuitively means that while player I controls u 1 , player II controls u 2 . We assume that each player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other player and does not gain anything by changing his strategy unilaterally. If each player is making the best decision she can, based on the other player's decision, then we say that the two players are in Nash Equilibrium.
3.
A stochastic maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential games
In this section, we shall find the Nash equilibrium for Problem 2.1 based on a stochastic maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-backward differential equation.
Define the Hamiltonians
:=f i (t, x, e n , u 1 , u 2 ) + ag i (t, x, e n , y, z, k, v, u 1 , u 2 ) + p i b(t, x, e n , u 1 , u 2 )
where R denote the set of all functions k : [0, T ] × R 0 → R for which the integral in (3.1) converges. We suppose that H i , i = 1, 2 is Fréchet differentiable in the variables x, y, z, k, v, u and that ∇ k H i (t, ζ), i = 1, 2 is a random measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to ν. Next, we define the associated adjoint process A i (t), p i (t), q i (t), r i (t, ·) and w i (t), t ∈ [0, T ] and ζ ∈ R by the following forward-backward SDE (1) The Markovian regime-switching forward SDE in
Here and in what follows, we use the notation
In what follows, we give the sufficient maximum principle. Let ( u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 with corresponding solutions
and (3.3) respectively for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the following holds:
(1) The functions
are concave for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2.
(2) The functions
for i = 1, 2. Then u = ( u 1 (t), u 2 (t) is a Nash equilibrium for (2.1), (2.7) and (3.2).
Proof. See Appendix.
3.1. An equivalent maximum principle. The concavity condition on the Hamiltonians does not always hold on many applications. In this section, we shall prove an equivalent stochastic maximum principle which does not require this assumption. We shall assume the following:
t -measurable random variable θ(ω), the control process β(t) defined by
Assumption A2. For all u i ∈ A i and all bounded β i ∈ A i , there exists δ i > 0 such that
Assumption A3. For all bounded β i ∈ A i , the derivatives processes
exist and belong to L 2 (λ × P ).
It follows from (2.1) and (2.7) that
(3.13) We can obtain dX 2 (t) and dy 2 (t) in a similar way. We can state the following equivalent maximum principle .3) and corresponding derivative processes X i (t) and (y i (t), z i (t), k i (t, ζ), v i (t)) given by (3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Suppose that Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Moreover, assume the following growth conditions
and
Then the following are equivalent:
Remark 3.3. The result is the same if we start from t ≥ 0 in the performance functional, hence extending [15, Theorem 2.2] to the Markov regime-switching setting.
Zero-sum Game. In this section, we solve the zero-sum Markov regime-switching forwardbackward stochastic differential games problem (or worst case scenario optimal problem):
That is, we assume that the performance functional for Player II is the negative of that of Player I, i.e.,
In this case, (u * 1 , u * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium iff ess sup
On one hand, (3.18) implies that ess inf
(ess sup
≤ ess sup
On the other hand, we always have ess inf(ess sup) ≥ ess sup(ess inf). Hence, if (u * 1 , u * 2 ) is a saddle point, then ess inf
The zero-sum Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential game problem is therefore the following:
When it exists, a control (u * 1 , u * 2 ) satisfying (3.19), is called a saddle point. The actions of the players are opposite, more precisely, between player I and II there is a payoff J(t, u 1 , u 2 ) and it is a reward for Player I and cost for Player II. Remark 3.5. As in the non-zero sum case, we shall give the result for t = 0 and get the result for t ∈]0, T ] as a corollary. The results obtained in this section generalize the ones in [15, 1, 9, 11, 7] .
In the case of a zero-sum game, we only have one value function for the players and therefore, Theorem 3.2 becomes Theorem 3.6 (Equivalent maximum principle for zero-sum game). Let u ∈ A with corresponding solutions X(t) of (2.1), (Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ζ), V (t)) of (2.7), A(t) of (3.2), (p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ), w i (t)) of (3.3) and corresponding derivative processes X 1 (t) and (y 1 (t), z 1 (t), k 1 (t, ζ), v 1 (t)) given by (3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Assume that conditions of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1)
where
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.7. If u = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 is a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game in Theorem 3.6, then equalities (3.21) holds.
Proof. If u = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 is a Nash equilibrium, then it follows from Theorem 3.6 that (3.20) holds by (3.18).
Applications

4.1.
Application to robust utility maximization with entropy penalty. In this section, we apply the results obtained to study an utility maximization problem under model uncertainty. The framework is that of [1] . We aim at finding a probability measure Q ∈ Q F that minimizes the functional
where Q F := Q|Q ≪ P, Q = P on F 0 and H(Q|P ) := E Q ln dQ dP , with α 0 and α 0 being non-negative constants; κ = (κ(t)) 0≤t≤T a non-negative bounded and progressively measurable;
is the discount factor and R κ (t, T ) is the penalization term, representing the sum of the entropy rate and the terminal entropy, i.e
with G Q = (G Q (t)) 0≤t≤T is the RCLL P -martingale representing the density of Q with respect to P , i.e G Q (t) = dQ dP Ft G T represents the Radon-Nikodym derivative on F T of Q with respect to P . More precisely
In the present regime switching jump-diffusion setup, we consider the model uncertainty given by a probability measure Q having a density (G θ (t)) 0≤t≤T with respect to P satisfies the following SDE
(4.7) Note that θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 ) may be seen as a scenario control. Denote by A the set of all admissible controls θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 ) such that
and θ 2 (t, ζ) ≥ −1 + ǫ for some ǫ > 0. (4.13) can be rewritten as
Using Itô-Lévy product rule, we have
Substituting (4.10) into (4.8), leads to 
where β > 0 is a constant describing the strength of the penalty term.
We have the following theorem Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the penalty function is given by (4.9). Then the optimal Y Q * is such that (Y Q * , Z, W, K) is the unique solution to the following quadratic BSDE
14)
Moreover, the optimal measure Q * solution of Problem 4.1 admits the Radon-Nikodym density
(4.15)
Proof. One can see that Problem 4.1 can be obtained from our general control problem by setting
Since h(θ) given by (4.9) is convex in θ 0 , θ 1 and θ 2 , it follows that conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. The Hamiltonian in this case is reduced to:
Minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 ) gives the first order condition of optimality for an optimal θ * , On the hand, one can show using product rule (see for e.g., [14] ) that Y given by (4.12) is solution to the following linear BSDE In this section, we use our general framework to study a problem of optimal investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. The uncertainty here is also describe by a family of probability measures. Such problem was solved in [7] using dynamic programming approach. We shall show that our general maximum principle enables us to solve the problem. We shall restrict ourselves to the case E
The model is that of [7, Section 2.1]. Let (Ω, F, P ) be a complete probability space with P representing a reference probability measure from which a family of real-world probability measures are generated. We shall suppose that (Ω, F, P ) is big enough to take into account uncertainties coming from future insurance claims, fluctuation of financial prices and structural changes in economics conditions. We consider a continuous-time Markov regime switching economic model with a bond and a stock or share index.
The evolution of the state of an economy over time is modeled by a continuous-time, finitestate, observable Markov chain α := {α(t), t ∈ [0, T ]; T < ∞} on (Ω, F, P ), taking values in the state space S = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e D }, where D ≥ 2. The dynamics of (α(t)) 0≤t≤T is given in Section 2.
Let r = {r(t)} t∈[0,T ] be the instantaneous interest rate of the money market account B at time t. Then
where ·, · is the usual scalar product in R D and r = (r 1 , . . . , r D ) ∈ R D + . Here the value r j , the j th entry of the vector r, represents the value of the interest rate when the Markov chain is in the state e j , i.e., when α(t) = e j . The price dynamics of B can now be written as
(4.21)
Moreover, let µ = {µ(t)} t∈[0,T ] and σ = {σ(t)} t∈[0,T ] denote respectively the mean return and the volatility of the stock at time t. Using the same convention, we have
In a similar way, µ j and σ i represent respectively the appreciation rate and volatility of the stock when the Markov chain is in state e j , i.e., when α(t) = e j . Let B = {B t } t∈[0,T ] denotes the standard Brownian motion on (Ω, F, P ) with respect to its right-continuous filtration
Then, the dynamic of the stock price S = {S(t)} t∈[0,T ] is given by the following Markov regime-switching geometric Brownian motion
be a real-value Markov regime-switching pure jump process on (Ω, F, P). Here Z 0 (t) can be considered as the aggregate amount of claims up to and including time t. Since Z 0 is a pure jump process, one has 
Here the value λ o j , the j th entry of the vector λ 0 , represents the intensity rate of N when the Markov chain is in the space state e j , i.e., when α(t − ) = e j . Denote by F j (ζ), j = 1, . . . , D the probability distribution of the claim size ζ := Z 0 (u)−Z 0 (u − ) when α(t − ) = e j . Then, the compensator of the Markov regime switching random measure N 0 (·, ·) under P is given by
Hence a compensated version N 0 α (·, ·) of the Markov regime-switching random measure is defined by
The premium rate P 0 (t) at time t is given by
29)
be the surplus process of the insurance company without investment. Then The following information structure will be important for the derivation of the dynamic of the company' surplus process. Let
t and F α t and write F = {F t , t ∈ [0, T ]} as the information accessible to the company.
From now on, we assume that the insurance company invests the amount of π(t) in the stock at time t, for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then π = {π(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} represents the portfolio process. Denote by X = {X π (t)} t∈[0,T ] the wealth process of the company. One can show that the dynamic of the surplus process is given by
(4.32) Definition 4.5. A portfolio π is admissible if it satisfies (1) π is F-progressively measurable; (2) (4.32) admits a unique strong solution;
t , and for n, j = 1, . . . , D, let {C nj (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} be a real-valued, G-predictable, bounded, stochastic process on (Ω, F, P) such that for each t ∈ [0, T ] C nj ≥ 0 for n = j and D n=1 C nj (t) = 0, i.e, C nn ≤ 0. We consider a model uncertainty setup given by a probability measure Q = Q θ,C which is equivalent to P , with Radon-Nikodym derivative on F t given by dQ dP
where, for 0
..,D is a family of rate matrices of the Markov chain α(t); See for e.g., [5] . For each t ∈ [0, T ], we set
The Radon-Nikodym derivative or density process G θ,C is given by
where ′ represents the transpose. Here (θ, C) may be regarded as scenario control. A control θ is admissible if θ is F-progressively measurable, with θ(t) = θ(t, ω) ≤ 1 for a.a (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, and T 0 θ 2 (t)dt < ∞. Next, we formulate the optimal investment problem under model uncertainty. Let U : (0, ∞) −→ R, be an utility function which is strictly increasing, strictly concave and C 2 . The objectives of the insurance firm and the market are the following: Problem 4.6. Find a portfolio process π * ∈ A and the process (θ * , C * ) ∈ Θ × C such that
This problem can be seen as a zero-sum stochastic differential game problem of an insurance form. On one hand, we have
Then, it can easily be shown that Y (t) is the solution to the following linear BSDE
(4.39) Noting that
Problem 4.6 becomes Problem 4.7. Find a portfolio process π * ∈ A and the process (θ * , C * ) ∈ Θ × C such that
where Y θ,C,π is described by the forward-Backward system (4.32) and (4.39).
Theorem 4.8. Let X π (t) be dynamic of the surplus process satisfying (4.32). Consider the optimization problem to find π * ∈ A and (θ * , C * ) ∈ C such that (4.36) (or equivalently (4.41)) holds, with
Moreover, suppose that U (x) = −e −βx , β ≥ 0. Then the optimal investment π * (t) and the optimal scenario measure of the market (θ * , C * ) are given respectively by
44)
and the optimal C * satisfies the following constraint linear optimization problem: where V j is given by (4.64).
Moreover, if we assume that the space of family matrix rates (C nj ) n,j=1,2 is bounded and write C nj (t) ∈ C l (n, j), C u (n, j) with C l (n, j) < C u (n, j), n, j = 1, 2. Then, in this case, the optimal C * is given by:
The same we have that the solution for problem 4.70 is given by:
Proof. It is easy to see that this is a particular case of a zero-sum stochastic differential game of the forward-backward system of the form (2.1) and (2.7) with φ = Id, φ = f = g = 0, h(x) = U (x). The Hamiltonian in Section 3 is reduced to H(t, x, e n y, z, k, v, π, θ, a, p, q, r 0 , w)
The adjoint processes A(t) ,(p(t), q(t), r 0 (t, ζ), w(t)) associated with the Hamiltonian are given by the following forward-backward SDE
A(0) = 1, (4.49) and    dp(t) = −r(t)p(t)dt + q(t)dB(t) +
(4.50) It is clear that the functions h, φ and H satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.6. Maximizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to π gives the first order condition for an optimal π * .
The BSDE (4.50) is linear in p, hence we shall try a process p(t) of the form
where f (·, e n ) is a deterministic differential equation to be determine. Applying the Itô-Lévy's formula for jump-diffusion, Markov regime-switching process (see for e.g., [19, Theorem 4 .1]),
Putting A(t)e −βX(t) = P 1 (t), then p(t) = βf (t, α(t))P 1 (t) and using once more the Itô-Lévy's formula for jump-diffusion Markov regime-switching process, we get dp(t) =βd f (t, α(t))P 1 (t)
where (D C 0,α (t)) j = (D C 0 (t)α(t) − 1) j . Comparing (4.54) with (4.50), by equating the terms in dt, dB(t), N α (dζ, dt), and d Φ j (t) j = 1, . . . , D, respectively, we get
Substituting this into (4.51) gives,
On the other hand, we also have r 0 (t, ζ) = p(t) e βζ − θ(t) − 1 (4.56) and
with the function f (·, e n ) satisfying the following backward (ordinary) differential equation:
with the terminal condition f (T, e n ) = 1, for n = 1, . . . , D. The solution of such backward equation can be found in [7] . Minimizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to θ gives the first order condition for an optimal θ * .
The BSDE (4.39) is linear in Y , hence we shall try the process Y (t) of the form
where f 1 (·, e n ), n = 1, . . . , D is a deterministic function satisfying a backward differential equation to be determined. Applying the Itô-Lévy's formula for jump-diffusion Markov regime-switching, we get dY (t) =f
Comparing (4.61) and (4.39), we get
Substituting Z(t) and K(t, ζ) into (4.59), we get
The function f 1 (·, e n ) satisfies the following backward differential equation
with the terminal boundary condition f 1 (T, e n ) = −1 for n = 1, . . . , D. The solution to the previous equation is given by
with
As for the optimal (C nj ) n,j=1,...,D , the only part of the Hamiltonian that depends on C is the sum
, Hence minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to C is equivalent to minimizing the following system of differential operator C nj (t) = 0.
Hence, one can obtain the solution in the two-states case(since C is bounded ) with V j and f 1 given by (4.66) and (4.67) respectively. More specifically, when the Markov has only two states, we have to solve the following two linear programming problems:
subject to the linear constraint C 11 + C 21 = 0. and
subject to the linear constraint C 12 + C 22 = 0. By imposing that the space of family matrix rates (C nj ) n,j=1,2 is bounded we can write that C nj (t) ∈ C l (n, j), C u (n, j) with C l (n, j) < C u (n, j), i, j = 1, 2. The solution to the preceding two linear control problems are then given by:
The proof is completed In fact, substituting (4.62)-(4.64) into (4.61), we get
(4.73)
Hence for r = 0, we see that f (t, e n ) satisfies: f ′ 1 (t, e n ) − βP 0 (t) + βπ(t)µ(t, e n ) − 1 2 β 2 σ 2 (t, e n )π 2 (t)
− βθπ(t)σ(t, e n ) + The latter is [7, Equation (4.13) ]. Moreover, f given by (4.58) and f 1 given by (4.66) coincide in this case.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented general stochastic maximum principle for Markov regimeswitching forward-backward stochastic differential equation to study existence of Nash equilibrium for stochastic differential games under partial information. The proposed model covers the model uncertainty in [1, 7, 9, 11, 15] , since we include Markov regime switching coefficients in the state process and we deal with stochastic differential utility. The advantage of our equivalent maximum principle is that it allows for optimization of very general performance functionals and does not assume concavity of the Hamiltonian. We then apply our results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under penalty risk measure. We show that the optimal value function is can be describe by a quadratic backward stochastic differential equation. Another application pertains to optimal investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. This problem can be formulated as a problems as two-player, zerosum, stochastic differential games between the market and the insurance company, where the market control the mean relative growth rate of the risky asset which is playing against the company and the company control the investment. Note that, as pointed in [7] , this model is general enough to include four sources of risk, particularly financial risk, insurance risk, economic risk and model risk. We find close form solutions of the optimal strategies of the insurance company and the market, when the utility is of exponential type and the Markov chain has two states.
Delayed systems have been study in the past decades to include the memory dependence of some processes. In this situation, the dynamic at the present time t does not only depend on the situation at time t but also on a finite part of their past history. Extension of the present work to the delay case could be of interest. Such results were derived in [14] , in the case of no regime-switching. Another interesting question will be whether or not to introduce delay in the Markov chain and to check the effect.
By the definition of H 1 , we get =E A 1 (T ){h 1 (X(T ), α(T )) − h 1 ( X(T ), α(T ))} − E Hence we get
Summing (A.5)-(A.7) up, we have
H 1 (t, u(t)) − H 1 (t, u(t)) − ∂ H 1 ∂x (t)(X(t) − X(t)) − ∂ H 1 ∂y (t)(Y 1 (t) − Y 1 (t))
One can show, using the same arguments in [10] that, the right hand side of (A. Then i(x, y, z, k, v) ≤ 0 for all x, y, z, k, v.
